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On the Horns of a Dilemma
R Fletcher*
Introduction
Illegality, as a concept, covers a multitude of sins and
the differences that arise and the decisions of the
courts are based on the principle of public policy.
Under this heading it is the author’s intention to
examine the resulting trust, through the transfer of
property in furtherance of a fraud, and illegality.
Therefore, for the purpose of this discussion the
Insolvency Act 1986 and the Insolvency (No.2) Act
1994 will not be examined.
The Resulting Trust
A resulting trust occurs through operation of law, ie,
there is no need for any specific formalities for such a
trust to arise, and the beneficial interest results back to
the person who has provide the money. For example,
A provides the finance and B purchases the property
in his name. In this instance B would hold the
property as trustee for A the beneficiary, under a
resulting trust. Alternatively, a person about to start a
risky business is concerned his debts may exceed his
assets and decides to transfer his assets to his wife or
son to render them safe from potential creditors.
Complications have arisen in recent years when parties
have used such a device to preserve property from
creditors or for some other illegal purpose. It is usual
in such circumstances to follow the equitable
principles and let the loss lie where it falls.1 However,
as will be shown, the House of Lords has qualified
this position and in given circumstances a person is
now able to claim an interest in property, under a
resulting trust, where there is no need to rely upon the
illegal purpose.
Legal Title
A person is entitled to dispose of his property, ie, legal
title, through the use of a trust and under the right
circumstance such property would be protected should
bankruptcy occur. Thus, the transferor would no
longer have legal title to the property, it now belongs
to the transferee. It is essential, for the transfer to be
successful, that the transferor relinquishes any form of
interest in the property, legal and equitable, if it is to
be out of the reach of the transferor’s creditors. If the
transferor then wishes to claim the property back s/he
has to prove the existence of a trust in his or her
favour, as a beneficiary. Arguably, there was not a
trust created in the first place, as this would defeat the
objective of the transferor. For s/he must not hold any
interest in the property to defeat the claims of the
creditors. What the transferor is saying is: if I become
bankrupt then there was no trust. I transferred
complete ownership of the property, legal and
equitable. However, should bankruptcy not occur,
then there is a trust and I now claim the beneficial
interest. The substance of such agreements is self-
evident – to commit a fraud against potential creditors.
Advancement
Such arrangements have arisen within marriages,
families and partnerships. However, relationships
break down, with the consequence of the transferee
either claiming there was no trust, or the presumption
of advancement is assumed due to the nature of the
relationship between the parties. The principle of
advancement assumes that a moral obligation exists
between the parties due to the nature of their
relationship. For example, when property is
transferred from husband to wife, but not from wife to
husband, and from father to child, the transfer is
presumed to be an outright gift.
The courts, when dealing with such cases, have been
asked to assist with claims in furtherance of an illegal
transaction, whilst resolving the principles of equity
and public policy. To demonstrate, a sample of cases
will be examined, along with the judicial reasoning, to
show how the law has developed and its current
position.
The Dilemma
The case of Tinker v Tinker [1970] 1 All ER 540
upholds the principle that you cannot transfer
property in such circumstances, and then attempt to
reclaim it at a later date. This case involved a
husband, who was self-employed, who was concerned
that his business might fail and to protect his family
home, on the advice of his solicitor, transferred the
property into the name of his spouse. The business
did not fail but his marriage did. The husband
attempted to reclaim the home from his wife claiming
she held it on trust for him absolutely. Lord Denning
considered the facts and was of the opinion that the
husband could not have it both ways: ‘‘So he is on the
horns of a dilemma.’’ The court held that the husband
was unsuccessful in his claim. His evidence, according
to the court, reinforced the presumption of
advancement and the property was a gift to the wife.
The case of Tinsley v Miligan [1994] 1 AC 340,
involved a relationship which did not give an
automatic presumption of advancement. This case
concerned Miss Milligan and Miss Tinsley, who were
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1 The principle may be traced back to the dictum of Lord Eldon
in Muckleston v Brown (1801) 6 Ves Jun 53, 69. This reflects the
common law principle laid down by Lord Mansfield in Holman
v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341, 343, that ‘‘[no] Court will lend its
aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or
illegal act’’.
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lovers. They purchased a home together which was
registered in the sole name of Miss Tinsley with the
intention that they should have equal shares in the
property. The purpose for omitting Miss Milligan’s
name from the legal title was to allow her to make
false claims for Housing Benefit. The couple parted
company and Miss Milligan claimed that Miss Tinsley
held the property on trust, in equal shares. Whilst
Miss Tinsley attempted to exclude this claim by using
the common law doctrine ex turpi causa non oritur
actio (no right of action arises from a base cause) and
through the equitable maxim ‘‘he who comes to equity
must come with clean hands’’.
It was the submission of the appellant, Miss Tinsel,
that:
‘‘. . . the court will not give effect to an equitable
interest arising from a transaction which is unlawful
by reason of a claimant’s unlawful purpose; and that
accordingly the respondent was unable to establish
any equitable interest in [the property], or defeat the
appellant’s claim to possession. This principle was
said to be well recognised in a number of
authorities; but reliance was placed in particular on
Gascoinge v Gascoine [1918] 1 K.B. 223 and Tinker v
Tinker [1970] 1 All ER 540, both decisions of the
Court of Appeal.’’2
However, by a bare majority, (Lord Keith and Lord
Goff dissenting) Miss Milligan was successful in her
claim based upon a resulting trust. The court found
that Miss Milligan was able to establish her equitable
interest without relying on the illegal transaction. This
appears to be contrary to public policy: to assist a
claim in furtherance of an illegal act. The property
was purchased in the sole name of Miss Tinsley to
allow Miss Milligan to make fraudulent claims for
housing benefit, which were shared between the
parties. Enonchong3 is critical of their Lordships’
decision and believes the illegal contract was relied
upon to prove Miss Milligan’s equitable interest under
the resulting trust. Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s
reasoning was:
‘‘. . . in cases where the presumption of advancement
does not apply, a plaintiff can establish his equitable
interest in the property without relying in any way
on the underlying illegal transaction. In this case,
the respondent . . . simply pleaded the common
intention that the property should belong to both of
them and that she contributed to the purchase price:
she claimed that in consequence the property
belonged to them equally . . . Therefore the
respondent was not forced to rely on the illegality to
prove her equitable interest.’’4
The law has developed, in such circumstances, along
these guidelines. For example, in the case of Tribe v
Tribe [1996] Ch 107 which concerned a plaintiff who
was responsible for the repairs on two business leases,
which had been served with notices for dilapidations
requiring substantial work to be carried out. The
plaintiff, faced with such demands, transferred his
shares in the family company to his son, the
defendant, to safeguard his assets. The illegality was
self-evident: to deceive the plaintiff’s creditors by
creating the impression he had no means of meeting
their demands. However, there was no need to
implement the scheme, any claims by the landlord
were met, there was no need to rely upon the
illegality. Thus, the father sought recovery of the
shares from the son who resisted and raised the
defence of illegality. The father’s claim was successful
on the basis that the illegal purpose had not been
carried out, it remained unfulfilled no creditor had
been deceived. Rose5 believes the decision in Tribe has
clarified the law:
‘‘by reformulating the rules on withdrawal [before
the illegal act takes place] . . . withdrawal can
suppress the defence of illegality, allow an otherwise
valid action in restitution to proceed, and provide an
independent, policy-motivated ground for
restitution.’’
However, although the father did not rely upon the
illegal act he did set it up in readiness to proceed.
Arguably, the decision of the Court of Appeal may be
sending out the wrong message and should reconsider
the issue when dealing with future claims.
Conclusion
The law has developed on an ad hoc basis which is not
consistent with common law rules, ie, a claimant
should not be assisted in the furtherance of an illegal
act. Their Lordships have used various mental
gymnastics to obtain, what they perceive, justice. It
appears ludicrous to enforce an arrangement where the
objective is to commit a fraud. Their Lordships have
supported their decision(s) based upon the premise:
the illegal act either did not occur or was nott relied
upon to enforce the trust. The law is supposed to
reflect the morals of our society and distinguish right
from wrong. It would appear from cases such as
Tinsley v Milligan and Tribe v Tribe the distinction is
not so clear.
2 [1994] 1 AC 340, p 253 (c-d).
3 1995, p 149.
4 At pp 371-372.
5 1996, pp 389-390.
Trusts
Business Law Review August/September 2000 197
